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Coincidentia Oppositorum and Love
NISHIDA kitaro
With an Introduction by Michael Finkenthal
The lecture entitled “ Coincidentia Oppositorum and Love” was deli­vered by Nishida KitarO (1870-1945) at Otani University, Kyoto, in 1919.The author was forty-nine years old at the time; his first book, An Inquiry into 
the Good, published in 1911, introduced his ideas on pure experience. “ An in­
dividual exists because there is experience,”  Nishida wrote in his preface to the 
book. At first glance, some of Nishida’s ideas sound very Hegelian; an attentive 
reading, however, unveils well definable departures from Hegel. Nishida’s 
original ideas were to be further clarified a few years later with the publica­
tion, in 1917, o f Intuition and Reflection in the Self-Consciousness. Abe Masao 
writes that after his first book dedicated to the subject of pure experience, 
Nishida had to “ develop a more logical inquiry into its structure. He had to 
reflect on intuition logically and to grasp the relation between intuition and re­
flection.” 1
1 Introduction to An Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990).
2 Like Hegel, Nishida equated logic with metaphysics.
The talk on “ Coincidentia Oppositorum and Love”  was therefore delivered 
while Nishida was actively engaged in the process of systematizing the logical 
foundations of his original philosophy; it was a logic to become known as the 
“ logic of unobjectifiable reality.” 2 This process was unfolding at the 
confluence of Zen Buddhism and Western (mostly German) idealist philos­
ophy. It is interesting to observe that Zen Buddhism is used in the work dis­
cussed here only as a pretext to set out the problem. Buddhism as a field of
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intellectual study requires the use of logic (which implies that it is essentially 
logical); at the same time, Nishida states that Buddhism “ is a religion whose es­
sence is love.”  Logic and affectivity are thus brought together in a simple, fac­
tual way. From the standpoint of the Western philosophical tradition, this 
move is surprising considering that logic and affectivity were, during the entire 
history of this tradition—from Socrates to Hegel—in strong and seemingly 
irreducible opposition.3
It is beyond the scope of this brief comment to pursue the long history of 
this incompatibility. Probably its best description is to be found in the works 
of Lev Shestov (1866-1938). Spinoza's “non ridere, non lugere, neque de- 
testari, sed intelligere” (not to laugh, not to lament, not to curse, but to under­
stand), has been often quoted in this context. Very early on, knowledge 
became, in Greece, rational knowledge expressed in universal and necessary 
statements. With Hegel, all that was real has become rational, and all that was 
rational was real. Rationality with its logical apparatus has imprisoned reality, 
that of nature as well as that of the individual, in the prison of the “ Almighty 
Law.” The prison of Necessity grew larger and larger until it could accommo­
date in it God himself. Again we hear Spinoza (in Ethics 1.33): “ Things could 
not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order differ­
ent from that which has in fact obtained.”  That is why we are surprised to 
hear that somebody trained at the schools of Western philosophical 
thought would state, as Nishida did so abruptly at the very beginning of his 
talk, that “ I believe [that] logic is linked at its root to human emotions.”
To prove this point was the main task Nishida took upon himself in his 
lecture. His approach anticipates in a way something which reminds us 
of Jaspers' method of “ formal transcending” in metaphysical thinking. He 
basically establishes a double identity, one between Logic and Coincidentia 
oppositorum, and another between Coincidentia oppositorum and Love 
(representing affectivity). Coincidentia oppositorum being the essential point 
of intersection between the finite and the infinite, as well as that of any con­
tradiction generating affective states, the link between logic and affectivity 
necessarily follows. But is this procedure convincing? Is it logically correct? 
Nishida himself seems to have had some doubts about it, for at the very end of 
the talk he says: “ There are of course major shortcomings in logic when we 
put forth an explanation of this kind [to account} for the process which links 
consciousness with love, but I will say no more for the time being.”
Nishida went on to say more on the subject in his written works of the twen­
ties and the thirties, but this is too broad a topic to be discussed further here.
’ Kierkegaard’s reaction to Hegel as well as to the different existentialisms o f the cen­
tury originated in this opposition.
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It is interesting to point out and comment upon a few of the details of the 
argumentation used in this lecture, as well as on the relationship between 
Nishida and contemporary Western thinkers involved in the research of cogni­
tive processes. In particular it would seem to me of great interest to follow 
Nishida’s use of mathematical constructs in his philosophical works.4
It was only natural that after a brief mentioning of the historical evolution 
of the idea of Coincidentia oppositorum, from Cusanus to Hegel, Nishida 
would mainly dwell on the latter’s discussion of the coincidence of the op­
posites. A brief but comprehensive comparison of Nishida and Hegel, rele­
vant for the present context, can be found in Abe Masao’s article, “ The Logic 
of Absolute Nothingness” (in the Nishida Kitard memorial issue of the East­
ern Buddhist, Autumn 1995). There is no need to further comment on this point. 
However, I would suggest that Schelling’s use of Coincidenta oppositorum in 
relationship to the finite-infinite is no less important than Hegel’s for under­
standing Nishida’s thinking about “ intuitive knowledge.”  Schelling tried to 
overcome the great epistemological difficulty left by Kant insofar as the possi­
bility of the knowledge of the Absolute was concerned. The Absolute was for 
Schelling (as it was for Kant), the identity of the Self and whatever is external 
to it. Kant in the “ Critique of Judgement,” argued against the possibility of 
an “ intellectual intuition,”  stating that such an intuition directly linked to 
reason would be impossible—in contradistinction with that related to sensorial 
knowledge—because reason implies necessarily the distinction between subject 
and object. For that reason, the object scrutinized must be external to the 
thinking subject. Schelling claims that such an “ intellectual intuition”  is 
possible, and makes his point by following the way a mathematician would 
arrive at the “ thought” of the abstract concept of a “ triangle.”  Euclid, or my-
4 It is well established that Nishida held a strong inclination toward mathematics 
from an early age, and that later, as a philosopher, he extensively used mathematical 
imagery and concepts borrowed from different scientific domains to clarify complex 
models and ways o f  argumentation. This is not a simple curiosity or a technical device; 
I believe it is important from a phenomenological point o f  view. In a future paper we 
shall see how the use o f  mathematical imagery has helped Nishida to “ compress”  his ar­
gumentation relative to the logic o f  place. A very important work on this subject is the 
paper “ Group Theory and Nishida’s Conception o f  the World” by Rydsuke Ohashi: 
“ Zoku ‘ShOgOron-teki’ jikaku, ‘gunron-teki’ jikaku” [Self-awareness according to set 
theory, continued, and according to group theory 1, in his book Nishida tetsugaku no 
sekai [The World o f  Nishida Philosophy] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobd, 1995), pp. 85-95. 
See also John C. Maraldo’s article in Japanese, “ Jiko shazd to jikaku: Dedekinto, 
Roisu to Nishida [Self-Mirroring and Self-Consciousness: Dedekind, Royce and Nishi­
da),”  in Nishida tetsugaku e  no to i [Questioning Nishida Philosophy], Ueda Shizu- 
teru, ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1990), pp. 33-68.
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self, or the reader o f this commentary, may draw a triangle on a blackboard or 
on his table and claim that this object determined by three straight lines, having 
the sum o f the three angles equal 180 degrees is a “ triangle.”  How would we 
know that any triangle, small or large, we would draw on the blackboard 
w ill have the same property? We must know it  through some sort o f an in tu i­
tion which is not related to  our senses (since we w ill not spend our entire life  
checking the veracity o f the above definition on each individual triangle we 
may draw). This intellectual (abstract, nonsensoral) intu ition is bom from  the 
simultaneous perception o f the finite, individual triangle(s) drawn on the 
blackboard, and that o f  the infinite number o f triangles necessarily implied in 
the concept o f “ triangle.'* Intellectual intu ition is thus associated with Co- 
incidenta oppositorum, the coincidence o f the finite and the infinite. That Ni- 
shida was aware o f this point we can infer from the fact that in  a contribution 
from  1911 called “ Gutoku Shinran,’ * he wrote: “ Just as in investigating the 
geometric properties o f triangles, one small one on the page is enough . .
A t the end o f  his brief presentation o f the Coincidenta oppositorum, Nishi- 
da concluded that “ Hegel’s ideas on in fin ity are not clear”  and turned to Can­
to r’s ideas about “ the nature o f the in fin ity .”  This move is perfectly justified: 
Cantor had indeed initiated the set theory precisely with the idea to clarify the 
mathematical meaning o f infin ity. Philosophers in the West were late to  under­
stand these new ideas and Cantor himself had great difficulty in convincing the 
German mathematical establishment o f the soundness o f his ideas; it  was only 
at the very end o f the century (more exactly at the first International Congress 
o f Mathematicians held in Zurich in 1897) that his work on set theory was 
generally recognized. I t  was only around this time that a book entitled L  ’in fin i 
mathematique (Mathematical In fin ity) published in France by L. Couturat 
made fo r the first time extensive use o f Cantor’s new ideas. In the following, I 
would like to say a few words which may help to  clarify the mathematical ar­
gumentations Nishida makes in his lecture.
I f  we assume fo r the moment a very “ loose”  definition o f a set, such as, fo r 
instance, a set is a collection o f objects (books, fo r instance), numbers (/,2, 
3,4) or letters (a,Z>,c,<7), we can define their power (Machtigkeit in Cantor’s 
language) and thus establish a connection or equivalence between them. I f  we 
compare the above mentioned sets o f numbers and letters, we may establish 
a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets; we w ill say that they 
have the same power or that they are equivalent. I f  now we compare the set, 
S = {  1,2,3} with S '=  {1,2,3,4}, we may say that S is a subset o f S' and conse­
quently S has a power which is less than that o f S' (we could call the power o f
5 nkz 1.407-409. For a study and translation, see Dennis Hirota, “ Nishida’s 
'Gutoku Shinran’,”  in Eastern Buddhist 28, 2 (1995), pp. 231-244.
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the set S, 3 and that o f S', 4). The two sets discussed above are finite sets, that 
is, the number of elements they comprise is finite. When we go from finite to 
infinite sets, such as those used as examples by Nishida in his talk, or the set of 
the natural numbers, N = {1,2,3. . . . n , . . . .) the problem o f the equivalence 
becomes a bit more complicated: a given set and one o f its subsets may have 
the same power. For instance, M =  {2,4,6. . . . 2 n ,. . . .}, which is the set o f  
the even natural numbers, is obtained by multiplying by two each natural num­
ber in the set N above. This new set has the same power as N (because there 
will always be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements o f the two 
sets, for that’s how we built them!). But M is a subset of N, because all the 
numbers in M exist in N, while the opposite is not true. Therefore, in the case 
of infinite sets, a set and its subset may have the same power. This fact con­
stitutes an indirect, but rigorous definition o f infinity. That this is so, has been 
observed by both Bernard Bolzano (mathematician and philosopher) and 
Richard Dedekind (mathematician) independently o f Cantor. (Cantor, 
however, went much further and extracted from the set theory many more far- 
reaching conclusions, relevant both for mathematics and philosophy.) That is 
what is meant by Nishida when he says that “ in the infinite, the whole equals 
the part.*’
Infinite sets therefore helped Nishida to establish an identity between the 
“ self-that-knows” and the “ self-that-is-known.” This state o f identity, Nishi­
da tells us, is that o f jikaku. We are again reminded o f Hegel’s Being, the 
unified but undetermined totality in which “ subjective” and “ objective” are 
undifferentiated. Jikaku has sometimes been translated as “awareness,” some­
times as “ self-awakening” or “ self-consciousness” or even “ self-awareness.” 
Thus, in the Introduction to An Inquiry into the Good, Abe Masao explains 
the standpoint of jikaku  as follows: “ Self-awakening” (or “ self conscious­
ness”) is “ an ontological and religious concept in which true reality awakens 
to itself and is awakened by us. In jikaku  the subject and object o f the awaken­
ing are one” (p. xxi). In an article on Nishida, Ueda Shizuteru writes: “ ‘Self- 
awareness’ combines in itself the aspect of being ‘the self-awareness of pure ex­
perience’ and the aspect o f being ‘reflection on reflection.’ . . . These two 
aspects completely interpenetrate each other.” 6 Again, the problem has been 
discussed at length by many authors: I would only point out here that regard­
less how we render the meaning o f “jik a k u ”  the essential question is to clari­
fy whether this is an ontological or a purely epistemological concept. 
Nishida’s argumentation in the discussed text is epistemological. We think 
simultaneously the opposites. But then, after having defined the totality which
6 Ueda Shizuteru, “ Nishida’s Thought,” trans. Jan Van Bragt, in Eastern Buddhist 
28, 1 (1995), pp. 29-47.
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holds together the opposites as being the field of the judgements, Nishida sin- 
gularizes it and materializes it into something which cannot be the object of 
consciousness. This something, called first "toAroro”  then “to itsu” seems for 
a moment to be ontological only to become a moment later epistemological, 
“ the intuition of totality.”
From that point on, Nishida switches to the discussion of intuition as a tool 
of knowledge, and one can anticipate that reference will be made to Bergson. 
Abe Masao (and others) have pointed out the effort Nishida made, in particu­
lar in his second work published shortly before the lecture under discussion 
here, to solidify his own standpoints in relation to the prevailing German Neo­
Kantianism and Bergson’s philosophy. The references to Poincard are based 
mainly on the chapter of Science et Methode (Science and Method), published 
in 1908, which dealt with the role intuition played in mathematical knowledge. 
In the essay “ Mathematical Invention” reproduced in this book, Poincard ex­
plained how the rules of induction and all conventional logic break down 
when the scientist arrives at the formulation of a completely new hypothesis. 
An invention is intuited in its totality and it is impossible to explain it in logi­
cal terms. The things are “ rather/e// than explicitly stated” (my emphasis). It 
seems that this is what Nishida meant when he said: “ When such intuitions 
arise . . . they are said to assume the form of emotions.”  God must be intuit­
ed in the same way; Nishida concluded his talk by saying at the end: “ God 
or Buddha can never be the object of consciousness.”  And then he add­
ed, “ We can experience God or Buddha through the intermediary of the 
emotions.”
Small works, like the one translated here, may sometimes be as informative 
as long and elaborate books. In a lecture the author must present his ideas 
clearly. The public in front of him represents a fast feedback system. Also, a 
lecture is a rethinking and a reappraisal of the ideas expressed elsewhere by the 
author. It presents ideas and it raises questions. I shall not summarize; instead 
I will try to adopt this method of presenting brief texts and commenting upon 
them. This is therefore the first short text in a series in which we will try to fol­
low mainly (but not exclusively), the use of mathematical constructs and scien­
tific imagery in Nishida KitarO’s works.
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Coincidentia Oppositorum and Love
N ishida  Kita rO
Coincidentia oppositorum is a term often encountered in the history of philosophy; it means the coincidence of opposites. I 
have chosen this theme [for today’s lecture] for the following reason: 
Buddhism is a rigorous field of study that demands logic; at the same 
time it is a religion whose essence is love. I wish therefore to discuss the 
relationship between logical arguments on the one hand, and the love 
which is the essence of this religion familiar [to us], on the other. Logic 
is often portrayed as cold and aloof; still I believe that logic is linked at 
root to human emotions; hence I chose this topic.
Coincidentia oppositorum was a term used at the beginning of the 
modern era, that is, around the Renaissance, by Nicolaus Cusanus 
[1401-1464]. This notion originated with the Christian mystics for 
whom God presented an impenetrable mystery which could only be ex­
pressed in negative terms. This is quite similar to Buddhism’s use of the 
character fu  or “ not,”  to express reality. The mystics asserted that 
since God could not be said to be all-knowing and all-powerful, neither 
could God be said to exist or not to exist. To fully express this notion 
Cusanus coined the term “ coincidentia oppositorum.”
Generally, God is thought of as being infinite, with the opposition of 
God to the world being the opposition of the infinite to the finite. But 
even though God is infinite, this is not an infiniteness that denies the 
finite. Otherwise, how could the infiniteness of God give birth to the 
world, and how would it be possible for God’s infiniteness to be linked
* This is a translation o f Nishida’s “ Coincidentia oppositorum to a i,”  in nkz 
14:295-300. It was originally presented on 13 October 1919 (TaishO 8) at Otani Univer­
sity, Kyoto, as a lecture commemorating the founding o f  the school and was published 
in a special DaimuryOjukyO [Larger Sutra o f  Infinite Life] issue o f  Mujinto  24 (Novem­
ber 1919). We Wish to thank John C. Maraldo for editing the translation. Annotation 
has been provided by the translator.
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with the finite? God’s infiniteness is not one that denies the finite, but 
an infiniteness which brings the finite and the infinite to coincide, that 
is, coincidentia oppositorum. God brings all opposites to coincide; God 
is the agent which brings all things that are logically contradictory into 
coincidence. It was thought, therefore, that God’s nature expressed it­
self by unifying incompatible elements.
This kind of thinking can also be found in [expressions of] Bud­
dhism’s logical structure as well. It is when our usual mode of think­
ing has played itself out and we are at our wits end, that we stand on 
the threshold of this kind of thinking. Cusanus explained this concept in 
mathematical terms: a single line, for instance, is infinite, as is any part 
of it. Seen from the standpoint of the whole the part ought to be finite, 
but he postulates that the infinite is contained within the part.
While his formulation of the infinite may no longer be wholly tena­
ble in light of today’s mathematics, I believe the spirit of his [argu­
ment] contains an element of truth. At any rate, the notion of coinciden­
tia oppositorum has [since] made deep inroads into philosophy.
After Cusanus, Giordano Bruno [1548-1600] adopted the notion 
into the groundwork of his philosophy. Jacob Boehme [1575-1624] 
also incorporated this notion of the coinciding of contradictory events 
into the foundations of the universe. In later generations we find that 
F. W. J. Schelling’s [1775-1854] thought arrives at Cusanus’s coin­
cidentia oppositorum via Bruno. Yet another thinker who articulately 
expressed the relation of the finite and the infinite was G. W. F. Hegel 
[1770-1831].1 Hegel divided infinity into two types: schlechte Unend- 
lichkeit, or “ bad infinity,” and das Unendliche, or “ true infinity.” 
True infinity is the coincidence of the finite and the infinite, that is, 
coincidentia oppositorum. Whereas [true infinity] is independent and 
freely imparts itself, bad infinity is an infinite that is relative to the 
finite. What is implied thus in the concept of bad infinity is that the 
world of conventional truth must be abandoned, as it is a realm of evil,
1 Hegel would have been familiar to the members o f  this particular audience 
through the works o f  religious philosopher Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903), the founder 
o f the school, who frequently discusses the notion o f Infinite and finite. We may as­
sume that Nishida was aware o f  Kiyozawa’s writings which had appeared in a three- 
volume Collected Works between 1912-1915. There is also evidence that Nishida exam­
ined one o f Kiyozawa’s original manuscripts firsthand at an earlier date; see his diary 
entry for 16 March 1914 (TaishO 3) in nkz 17:335.
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and that asceticism must be instituted to rid the world of evil; briefly, 
this amounts to a denial of the sphere of everyday reality. In contrast, 
true infinity is what abides in this realm of desires and yet is not defiled 
by it.2 Its stature is that of the great secret whose truth is open to all. 
Hegel thus characterized true infinity as endlich and endlos at the 
same time. His ideas on infinity, however, are not clear. In our age, 
the person who clarified [the nature of infinity] was the mathematician 
Georg Cantor [1845-1918].
In his formulation, in the infinite the whole equals the part. For in­
stance, in the series:
(A) 1 2 3 4 5 . . . . . infinity
(B) 2 3 4 5 6 . . . . . infinity
(C) 3 4 5 6 7 . . ,. . . infinity
C
In this case, iboth B and C are part of A. That is, B is one [unit] less 
than A, and C is two [units] less. But A, B and C all correspond to one 
another, that is, the whole is equal to the part.
This concept has found application 
in differential and integral calculus, 
and even in geometry. If the two 
lines AB and AC of the figure are 
infinite, for instance, then the area 
of BAC is infinite. Next, when we 
draw the line AD, the area of BAD 
is again infinite. The area BAD, 
however, is clearly a part of the 
area BAC. However, as both of 
them are infinite, the part and the 
clarifies Cusanus’s idea to a further 
degree.
It is possible to experience this in the consciousness of self. The self 
knows the self. The self-that-knows is the same as the self-that-is- 
known. For instance, when one says “ I know the cup,” I am more than 
the cup, but when one says “ I know myself,” the self-that-knows and
A B
whole are equal in area. This
2 This Buddhist characterization o f true Infinity as being undefiled by this world 
would have struck a familiar chord with the audience.
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the self-that-is-known are one, hence the part and the whole are identi­
cal; this is true infinity, or experientially speaking, * ‘awareness ” 
(jikaku).
Coincidentia oppositorum was originally used as a term in religion, 
but it presently appears in mathematics and even in the “ awareness” of 
reality. In fact, I would contend that coincidentia oppositorum is 
present at the ground of all [forms] of consciousness. Conceptual con­
sciousness, the simplest example of which is judgment, takes the form 
A is B. To explain how the judgment A is B is arrived at, logic usually 
says this is by the linking of subject and predicate; but in fact, to arrive 
at the judgment A is B a unifying whole has to be assumed. Hegel, 
while referring to judgment, urteilen,3 says that judgment is arrived at 
by carving out the part from the whole. Wilhelm Wundt [1832-1920] 
says that a judgment like, “ The horse is running,” is divided-off from 
the direct perception the “ running horse,” by opposing the subject to 
the predicate. Therefore, at the ground of establishing consciousness, 
there has to be a unifying whole. For instance, when we say “ black 
is not white,” there is a totality wherein white and black are being com­
pared that gives birth to this judgment. And this totality is neither 
white nor black; yet it must have the potential to become white and 
to become black. This place (tokoro) that has the potential to be the 
opposite and to make the two poles coincide into one is Cusanus’s co­
incidentia oppositorum. It would seem that the totality should be the 
object of consciousness, but this is not the case. Consciousness is 
judgment. For judgment to take place it is necessary to have a totality 
(tOitsu) unifying subject and predicate. Thus the totality cannot be ex­
pressed as judgment. It can only retreat into infinity. And so in estab­
lishing consciousness, there is something that cannot become conscious­
ness. This [“ something” ] is the intuition of totality. This is the reason 
it cannot serve as the object of logical judgment. When we acquire a 
new consciousness, we acquire this so-called intuition. This is the 
case even ordinarily, but it is especially so when a person makes a great 
discovery: that is, rather than following the trail of logical associa­
tions, first the totality is intuited and then it is reconstructed logically. 
When the famous Frenchman H. J. PoincarS [1854-1912] made a dis-
3 The German word urteilen, “ to ju d g e /’ comes from Ur, or “ first,”  and Teit, or 
“ part.”
10
N ISH ID A : C O IN C ID E N T !A  O PPO SITO R U M  AND  LO VE
covery related to mathematical functions, he said it happened when he 
no longer rode stagecoaches. As in Poincare’s case, all discoveries arise 
when one arrives at a new unifying whole. When such intuitions arise, 
with regard to the form they take, they may be said to assume the form 
of emotions; and then they are reconstructed logically. Henri Bergson 
[1859-1941] believes that when our logical mind is fixed in one pattern, 
it rejects the incursion of other new patterns. The expansion of new 
consciousness or new life is guided by something that is like a mist at 
the bottom of our life.4 The most remarkable instance of this is genius.
I will now leave the subject of coincidentia oppositorum as the 
ground of consciousness, and turn my attention to how it is linked to 
love. For us, to truly love means bringing the contradiction of self and 
other to coincide. In other words, to love the other is to love our self. It 
is in the essence of love defined in such a way that coincidentia op­
positorum expresses itself in its purest form. This coincidentia op­
positorum is still expressed negatively in terms of logic, but is being 
apprehended positively in terms of love. At first all forms of conscious­
ness are independent of one another and are incompatible. By con­
solidating them into a unifying whole, in the way of coincidentia op­
positorum, we create the feeling of love. Love is the result of bringing 
into the unity of coincidence the opposition of self and other, the con­
tradiction arising from incompatibility of benefit and harm.
Such a love cannot be explained logically, but what we call in logical 
terms “ coincidentia oppositorum” takes the form of love on the stage 
of everyday life becoming thus the basis of all things. There are of 
course major shortcomings in logic when we put forth an explanation 
of this kind (to account] for the process which links consciousness with 
love, but I will say no more for the time being.
When we think of the problem in this way, I think it possible to say 
that the God or Buddha that religion speaks of is, in essence, love. At 
the extremity of consciousness is the persona, a persona that is already 
[standing in] coincidentia oppositorum, but the unifying agent of coin­
cidentia oppositorum is God or Buddha, love being the essence of God 
or Buddha. And so while God or Buddha can never be the object of
4 Nishida used Bergson’s Creative Evolution for his philosophy seminar at Kyoto 
University for several years around this time. We may assume that it was also a focus 
o f his classes at Otani University, where he held a lectureship for a number o f  years un­
til 1919.
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consciousness, we can experience God or Buddha via the appeal o f emo­
tions that brings us into unity with God or Buddha. For this reason, to 
know God consciously is, as the medieval negative theologians assert­
ed, impossible. However, coincidentia oppositorum forms the founda­
tion for all human activity, and we encounter its culmination in the 
form of love. Thus, an extremely logical concept turns out to be an ex­
tremely intimate fact of our real and everyday life. Is it not true that 
this meaning permeated Buddhism from such systems as the Hua-yen 
(Avatamsaka) to the JOdo ShinshQ?
Translated by W. S. Yokoyama
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